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Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradox of
Sustainable Development
A. DAN TARLOCK*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AND IMPLEMENTATION INSTITUTIONS

In the 1980s, sustainable development (SD) emerged as the international
environmental ground norm for evaluating both public and private resource use
choices. The story of SD's origins and success as a societal organizing concept
are well known. SD is the fruit of an ambitious effort in the 1980s to bridge the
chasm between developing and developed countries over the issue of
environmental protection.' Environmental protection, or environmentalism, is
primarily a movement that seeks to pay the bill for the social costs generated by
centuries of unrestrained development in the name of progress. 2 The idea that the
social costs of development should be assessed and mitigated works well in
developed countries, which have the public and private capital needed to strike a
new balance between the destruction and conservation of "nature."
Unfortunately, the idea works less successfully, if at all, in capital-poor
developing countries. After the 1972 United Nations Stockholm Conference,
developed countries enthusiastically embraced the duty to protect the
environment, but developing countries did not.3 Environmental protection spread
rapidly in the developed world, and many developing countries viewed it as a new
form of colonialism.
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1. See generally NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE INIERNAIUNAL

SYSTEM (1993) (discussing international economic policy in the new era following the end of the Second World
War).
2. See, e.g., CLIVE PONTING, A GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COLLAPSEOF
GREAT CIVILIZATIONS (1991); J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENrALI-IMRY

OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD 20-25 (2000) (The 20th century is unique for the intensity of humanproduced disruption in natural systems and the consumption patterns the disruption has produced will make it
difficult to adapt to changed circumstances).
3. See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL,

DIMENSIONS 63-64 (2d. 1990).
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The irony of environmental protection is that hath North and South are
correct Environmental protection must contain universal norms to address many
global issues such as ozone depletion, global climate change, and rain forest
destruction. In addition, the public health problems developing nations face
require that pollution be abated at roughly the same levels as in developed
countries. As many studies have concluded, however, effective environmental
protection is a function of a nation's wealth. Thus, ways must be found to
reduce poverty and improve the lot of nations in Africa, parts of Asia, and South
and North America.4 To this end, the Brundtland Commission (Commission)
concluded that development and environmental protection must be reconciled, and
that a new standard of development was accordingly necessary.5 The result was
SD, which the Commission's report &fined as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their needs."" SD, as the formulation states, is a bridge between the present
and future generations, and rests on the ethical principle that present generations
have a duty to restrain their consumption of resource stocks to conserve them for
future generations. 7
The beauty of principles that attempt to reconcile inconsistent ideas is that
each side can interpret those ideas to its advantage. The principal message of the
Commission's report-that environmental protection and development are not
incompatible-was welcomed by developing countries. Linking development and
environmental protection vindicated their long-standing position that the North's
argument that environmental protection is a universal imperative was simply a
new form of colonialism imposed by the more powerful developed countries to
preserve their access to raw commodities and to prevent industrial and political
development.
While developing countries naturally embrace the development component of
SD, developed countries, especially in Europe, were enthusiastic in their reception
of SD for a different reason: because it offered a vision of a more humane, less
materialistic society. As the 1996 Worldwatch Institute's State of the World
4. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).

5. The Commission, led by the then Prime Minister of Norway, was formed to bridge the North-South
impasse in environmental policy. The ensuing report elevated the concept of SDto a prominent place on the
international political agenda and is widely considered the seminal articulation of the idea and the justification for
integrating development and environmental protection.
6. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
7. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
PATRIMONY AND INTFRGENERATION EQUITY 17-93 (1989).

INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
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proclaimed, "Sustainable global development requires that those who are more
affluent adopt lifestyles within the planet's ecological means-in their use of
energy for example." 8 To the developed world, the Commission's report
vindicated the argument that environmental protection is a permanent part of the
global political agenda. These nations thus prefer the term Environmentally
Sustainable Development (ESD) to SD.
The conjoining of SD and ESD did not solve the problem of how to induce
effective environmental protection in developing countries, but it achieved the
Commission's immediate, primary purpose:
it allowed the debate about
environmental protection to proceed with the participation of most developing
nations. Each side had to accept a key principle of the other. It also achieved the
Commission's secondary purpose: environmental protection was enshrined as an
integral part of the development debate. Other than in the United States, SD and
ESD quickly became the "discourse" of national and international environmental
policy. SD and ESD were formally married in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development. 9 Principle 1 of the Declaration proclaims that "[h]uman beings
are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature."' 0 Principle 3 proclaims that
the right to development-the core of the developing nation's legal argument that
they can subordinate environmental protection to development-must equitably
meet the developmental and environmental needs of future generations.'
Principle 4 proclaims that environmental protection is an integral part of the
development process.12 In short, SD is, at least in the eyes of the developed
world, necessarily ESD.
The ultimate test of a concept intended to have legal force and profound
social and economic consequences is whether it changes behavior at both the
individual and institutional levels.13 The jury is still out on SD and ESD.
Problems start with the Commission's formulation linking development and
8. WORLDWATCH INST., STATE OF THE WORLD 1996: A WORLDWATCH REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARDA
SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 12 (1996).
9. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M 874.

10. Id. at 876.
1 I d. at 877.
12. ld
13. See J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31 (1999); David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining SustainableDevelopment: NEPA
Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. I., Fall 1998, at 1.
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environmental protection, 14 a formulation that has met with much criticism.
More radical environmentalists argue that environmental protection and
development are not in fact compatible, and thus the concept will not further
environmental protection and may indeed undermine it. To them, SD is simply
repackaged rapid, unsustainable growth. China is a case in point for these critics.
The Chinese government has embraced the idea of SD, but reports continue to
trickle out that environmental problems remain unaddressed in the country's rapid
and largely unrestrained growth.' 5 There, SD or ESD is all rhetoric and no
action. Other critics suggest that because SD attempted to marry two
incompatible ideas, environmental protection and development, the resulting
formulation has no consequences. These critics argue that the reconciliation
came at the cost of a vacuous formulation that is doomed to irrelevance except in
glossy policy documents, likely to be filed and forgotten. 16 There is considerable
merit in this argument, as SD's concepts are so vague and open that any action
can be justified as the practice of SD. "7 Nonetheless, SD contains three core
ideas: (1) the acceptance of limitations on the exploitation and consumption of
many resources, (2) the recognition that present generations owe conservation
duties to future generations, and (3) the necessity to integrate these duties into
individual as well as public choices. ESD adds a fourth: development must take
place with far less environmental destruction than has been the case in the past.
These criticisms are powerful. SD and ESD are like the "smart growth"
movement in the United States. No one is in favor of "dumb" growth, but all
levels of government practice it. However, the post-Rio de Janeiro story of SD
and ESD has two contradictory narratives. First, the principles of SD and ESD
have in fact been quickly adopted throughout much of the world as the standard
against which public policy should be judged. This is particularly true in
developing countries such as China, even if the immediate consequences are not
evident. Europe has equally enthusiastically embraced these ideas. As it now
does on all international environmental protection issues, the United States lags

14. See discussion supra Part L
15. See China'sPollution: Exposing a Dirty Secret, EcONOMIST, July 21, 2001, at 34.
16. See, e.g., CALDWELL, supra note 3, at 274-75; Ronnie Lipschutz, Wasn't The Future Wonderful?
Resources, Environment, and the Emerging Myth of Global Sustainable Development, 2 COLO. J. INT'L&POL'Y
35 (1991).
17. See Sanford E. Gaines, Rethinking Environmental Protection, Competitiveness, and International Trade,
1997 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 231, 231-32 (1997). But see J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees ofRelevance: Why Should
Real-World Environmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L.
&.POL'Y F. 273, 273 (1998).
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behind many parts of the world in its commitment to SD. 18 Thus, one can
speculate that eventually specific activities, and not merely policy, will be judged
and modified according to the standards of SD and ESD. 19 This said, the second
narrative is that this implementation will never take place, because there is a
virtual disconnect between the adoption of SD and ESD as policy standards and

the institutional structures necessary to implement them. 20 This disconnect exists
in almost all countries regardless of their political system.2 ' It is, in my opinion,
the more accurate and important narrative relating to SD, and is the subject of this
article.
This article seeks to explain this institutional disconnect. I reject the
arguments of the deep ecology critics of SD and ESD as well as the arguments of
the skeptics that the concepts embodied in SD and ESD mean all things to all
people. SD and ESD do contain core principles that, if implemented, would
radically alter the way that we consume resources.
Specifically, the
implementation of SD and ESD would require that governance institutions,
representative bodies, laws that assign the rights and conditions for resource use,
and agencies that implement them must all be restructured to encourage more
"balanced" extraction, production, and consumptive patterns. It will not be

enough to put a "Save the Whales" stic ker on a lumbering, gas-guzzling sport
utility vehicle. The basic reason for the disconnect between SD and ESD and

governance institutions is that our current institutions are structured to encourage
unsustainable resource use. They do this by providing deeply embedded
incentives for immediate resource consumption that, at best, reflects a small
18. The Clinton administration did issue several reports on SD and ESD and attempted to make the concepts
the focus on specific policy studies. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE mBWA:
A NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, & A HEALTHY ENV'T FOR THE FUTURE (1996); W.WA'rF
POL'Y REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (1998).
19. See Ruhl, supra note 13.
20. The paucity of thinking about the necessary institutions to guide the transition to ESD is acknowledged and
the existing literature summarized in William C. Clark, A Transition Toward Sustainability,27 ECOLOGY LQ.
1021, 1064-69 (2001). One of the best explorations of the possible role for sustainable development is John C.
Dembach, Sustainable Development as a Frameworkfor National Governance, 49 CASE W. L. REV. 1 (1998).
21. Chile is an interesting case study. After the fall of the Pinochet dictatorship in 1990, a left -center
coalition
has governed Chile. The Pinochet era's embrace of deregulation and the free market has left the landscape suffering
from serious degradation and an economy which still rests largely on agricultural commodities, mineral, and timber
exports. Since 1990, the government has adopted the discourse of stewardship and sustainability and put in place a
basic U.S.-European-style system of environmental regulation. However, a recent analysis of Chilean
environmental politics concludes that the reforms are not effective because "they have been constructed and put into
practice in a polity and society in which elitist and neoliberal principles, practices and priorities prevail." David
Carruthers, Politics Environmental in Chile: Legacies of Dictatorshipand Democracy, 22 Third World Q. 343,
349 (2001). Thus, "Chile maintains a political economy often inimical to sustainability .. " Id. at 354.
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percentage of the total social cost of consumption, and by offering few, if any,
alternative incentives for exploitation and consumption that is more consistent
with SD and ESD.2 2
II. THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SD AND ESD

Two conditions are necessary to the success of ESD. First, the concept of
ESD must be embodied in a set of legal principles that constrain behavior, in order
that it may be integrated into existing legal systems. Second, an institutional
infrastructure must exist to implement those principles. Otherwise, SD will
remain an unrealized aspiration. SD and ESD are not self-executing initiatives.
They must be consistently defined and encouraged at the highest levels of
government. Law can give the concept of SD legitimacy, but only an institutional
infrastructure can actually implement the idea by applying it to specific resource
choices. The focus of this paper is primarily on the institutional implementation
of effective SD and ESD initiatives by governments. The rationale for this focus
is simple: effective environmental protection requires a strong public law and
institutional framework. This is, of course, only a partial recipe for the effective
realization of the goals of SD and ESD, as full implementation requires a mosaic
of public and private initiatives.
Fundamentally, the implementation of SD will require institutions designed to
produce substantive policy changes. SD and ESD can borrow some existing
environmental protection strategies, but it will be necessary to correct the
fundamental flaws in key protection strategies. There is a tendency to equate SD
and ESD with the more effective implementation of existing environmental goals.
Environmental protection is indeed an integral part of SD and ESD, but it is
necessary to distinguish SD and ESD from classic environmental regulation. The
purposes of environmental regulation can be roughly characterized as pollution
control and biodiversity conservation.2 3 These objectives are achieved primarily
through the regulation of large-scale private and public activities and the use of a
variety of procedural instruments to improve environmental assessment and
22. See infra notes 39 to 46, infra for a discussion of the importance of alternative incentives in the
implementation of SD and ESD.
23. RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 4 (1999) offers a three-fold characterization of pollution control, sustainable
natural resources management, and preservation of natural and cultural heritage, but this does not capture the extent

to which biodiversity conservation has replaced natural heritage preservation and influenced many aspects of natural
resources management.
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planning. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) remains the foundation
of environmental assessment. The core idea of NEPA is that decisionmakers
must consider a wide range of alternatives to the agency's usual way of doing
business, and this principle can be adapted to the implementation of SD and
ESD.24 It will, however, require a fundamental change from a procedural
approach to a procedural instrument that dictates substantive outcomes.2 5
SD and ESD cannot be divorced from environmental law, and their
implementation will take place in the context of environmental law's evolution.
This assertation is both positive and negative for the effective implementation of
SD and ESD. Environmental law is evolving, at least in the eyes of many
observers, from centralized planning to a more decentralized, inclusive system
that increasingly relies on markets and on voluntary compliance with
environmental norms.26 It is, however, clear that the institutional framework will
not be a simple command and control structure, but rather a complex network of
sanctions and incentives, an evolving mix of public regulation and private
initiatives.
Governments cannot be the sole implementers of ESD. The private sector,
from large corporations to individuals, has a large role to play in the
implementation of ESD and SD. In fact, we are seeing more and more cases
where SD and ESD are being implemented by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that identify leverage points in the production chain leading to retail sale
to induce adherence to SD and ESD. For example, pressure on homeimprovement retail stores in the United States and Great Britain induced them to
sell only timber produced from certified SD forests.27 Similarly, contrary to its
earlier practice, McDonald's now refuses to purchase beef from rain forests or
recently destroyed rain forests.2 8 This said, however, almost all the success in
environmental law has come either from the direct application of command and
control regulation or from private desires to innovate to avoid the application of
24. For a discussion of this concept, see infra Part Ill.

25. As William L. Andreen has observed, "[t]he impact statement or assessment is not an end in itself, but a
means to produce better substantive decisions." William Andreen, Environmental LaW and International
Assistance: The Challenge of Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World, 25 COLUM.J.D.Avrt
L. 17, 42 (2000). The need to expand the concept of environmental assessment is discussed more fully in bi#r Pat

V.
26. See Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, A Vision for the Future in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE
NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 231 (Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow eds., 1997).
27. James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service Economy, 47 UC[AL
REV. 411,463 (1999).
28. Id.
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command and control regulation. The project of joint public and private
implementation must rest on a strong, if only by default, public role, because the
current incentives for SD and ESD are basically the fear that the alternative of
non-implementation will be worse.
Existing environmental protection strategies do not promote SD and ESD,
because they generally do not address the root causes of environmental
degradation-the promotion of excessive levels of resource exploitation and
consumption-but instead seek only to minimize the worst aspects of activities
that threaten to degrade the environment. Sadly, but not surprisingly, three plus
decades of environmental regulation have not changed the fundamental structure
of unsustainable resource consumption. We have, of course, curbed some of the
worst sources of pollution-although perhaps not the most important-and
preserved some remnants of biodiversity. 29 But, as many students of
environmental regulation have forcefully observed, environmental regulation is a
modest overlay on the liberal institutions of private property and consumer
sovereignty. 30 Regulation does not challenge the fundamental idea that individuals
are allowed to determine the amount of their resource consumption, subject to the
caveat that they internalize some portion of the social costs of that consumption.
The external cost-minimization justification for environmental regulation
contemplates the possibility of resource use reduction as the gap between private
and social cost is narrowed. There may not be much evidence of serious
changes in consumption patterns. In contrast, SD seeks to identify the root
causes of behaviors that cause environmental degradation and to change them
substantially. It seeks to modify rather than mitigate. SD is thus a much more
radical ideal than environmental law, especially with respect to the laws put in
place between 1969 andl980. These "first generation" laws assume that
environmental protection can be accomplished with minimal disruption of existing
activities and within the framework of the Western liberal tradition and the
institutions we have erected to maintain that tradition. As the next section
illustrates, SD poses deeper challenges to this tradition and its institutions.

29. See Charles W. Powers & Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE
NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 20,20-23 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
30. See David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 680-708
(1994).
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III. WHY IT IS UNLIKELY THAT INSTITUTIONS WILL IMPLEMENT

SD

AND ESD

There are two explanations for the failure of new institutions to promote SD
and ESD. The first is philosophical. SD requires a radical redefinition of
individual responsibility. The second is structural. Our republican institutions and
the laws, regulatory, and other programs that they have produced, create
incentives to choose unsustainable and environmentally unsustainable practices
over sustainable ones.
31
A. It's Not My Fault,It's Yours

In the Western world, SD and ESD challenge the centuries-long project to
put the individual, rather than religious communities or the state, at the center of
the legal and political universe. The placement of the individual at the center of
the Western intellectual tradition limits individual responsibility for "bad" behavior
to two basic situations: (1) physical or (2) financial harm to another human
being. This is the core of our criminal law and tort systems. For example, the
hardest crimes to justify are "victimless" ones such as prostitution and gambling.
As I have analyzed in more detail elsewhere, 32 regulation of environmental
pollution and toxic substances is premised largely on the need for governments to
protect individuals from involuntary exposure to dangerous pollutants. There is
no room for the idea of individual responsibility to prevent pollution. Existing
pollution regulation therefore does not challenge the fundamental idea that
individuals may determine the amount of resources they use, provided they
internalize some portion of the demonstrated social costs of consumption.33
B. Representative Government Can Do Little More than Preserve the Status

Quo
Any concept that seeks to identify and modify the root causes of
environmental degradation will face formidable, perhaps insurmountable,
31.

RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN:" A HISTORY OF THE AmEIAN WESr

(1991).
32. A. Dan Tarlock, Genetic Susceptibility and Environmental Risk Assessment: An Emerging Link, 30
ENVTL. L. REP. 10277 (2000).

33. Much of the case for the use of information disclosure as a regulatory tool is that it will encourage
greater incentives to reduce harmful discharges. See Bradley C. Karkkanien, Information As Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 295

(2001).
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obstacles. SD and ESD do no less than challenge the two core functions of the
modem state. The first core function is the protection of the state from external
aggression through military means. SD and ESD challenge this goal by linking
social unrest with unsustainable development. National security has traditionally
been defined primarily as a problem of adequate military might, but
environmentalists somewhat successfully have linked environmental destruction
and the lack of SD with political instability and possible civil unrest or war.34 The

second core function, assumed by most modem states, is to enhance human
welfare. This goal has traditionally been met through the promotion of economic
development. A healthy rate of economic growth and a reasonable distribution of
wealth form the foundation for the effective realization and protection of the full
range of political, cultural and social human rights. Unsustainable development is
the price that nations have paid to maintain external and internal security.
It is, therefore, questionable whether modem government is adequately
prepared for SD. A few political scientists have raised the possibility that more
centralized, autocratic governments are better suited to achieve environmental
protection, 35 but this idea has been dropped from discourse, especially after
previous links between nature worship and Nazism were unearthed.36

Modem representative government seems to exhibit two related
characteristics: (1) minimal, cr decreased, performance expectations, and (2)
gridlock. Today, political institutions primarily perform two basic functions: (1)
defense of the status quo against proposals to change and (2) redistribution of
diminishing financial resources. There are many reasons for this including the
triumph of market allocation over competing theories of state organization, the
inability of European social democracies to maintain the welfare at its current
levels, and the increasingly tight link between wealth and access to the political
process. There are, of course, exceptions, but I regard these as positive
statements, and I leave to political scientists a full explanation. Not only does SD
cut against the grain of modem Western culture, it must be implemented in an era

34. For the classic articulation of this argument, see Jessica Tuehman Mathews, Redefining Security, 68
FOREIGN AFF. 162, 162-68 (1989).
35. The first serious effort was WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977), but the
second edition, WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN, JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY
REVISITED:

THE UNRAVELING OF THE

AMERICAN DREAM 281-307 (1992)

responded to criticisms that

environmentalism would require a Platonic dictatorship by stressing the democratic

environmentalism.
36. E.g., Luc FERRY, THE NEW ECOLOGICAL ORDER 92 (Carol Volk trans., 1995).

nature of serious
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when it is much more difficult for governments to formulate and carry out bold
new policy initiatives.
The weakening of government may have important consequences for the fate
of SD, because this weakening will make it much more difficult to implement SD
or ESD. That implementation requires legislatures to undertake reforms, often
with considerable risk, that cut against the status quo and the deeply entrenched
beliefs and behaviors that support it.37 The benefits and costs of new strategies
will not be known for some time. In addition, considerable subsidies are often
necessary to launch SD and ESD. U.S. energy policy illustrates this problem.
The United States now imports more petroleum than at the time of 1973
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoes. 38 The nation
has been unable to start a meaningful transition from non-renewable to renewable
energy sources, and has barely scratched the surface of energy conservation.
IV.

AGRICULTURE: A CASE STUDY IN UNSUSTAINABILITY

A corollary of gridlock is that reforms intended to move toward SD often
result in an increase in the level of unsustainable development. Agriculture, along
with energy production and consumption, is the poster child of unsustainable
activities that occur because of deeply embedded incentives to marginalize
sustainable alternatives.39 Pesticide use is a classic example of an unsustainable
agricultural practice. Since 1972, the Environmental Protection Agency has had
the power to ban the use of pesticides that pose significant, long-term public
health or environmental risks.40 However, once a pesticide is allowed on the
market, its application by users is not controlled. 4 1 Continued large-scale
pesticide use is one of the major reasons that non-point source pollution, much of
it from agricultural run-off, continues to offset the gains from the control of point

37. As Nicholas Robinson has observed, "[v]ested economic interests control decisions over many natural
resources, and are particularly ill-suited to define changes in their natural resource practices in order to accommodate
new policy to cope with global environmental trends." Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems, Decisionmaking,
and the Science of Earth's Systems: ProceduralMissing Links, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1077, 1090-91 (2000).
38. U.S. oil companies have diversified their overseas investments and much more oil now comes from nonOPEC countries; Canada, Great Britain, Norway, and Latin America are our new sources of supply. FRED
BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS & THE ENVIRONMENT.: CASES AND MATERIALS 1099 (2000).
39. COMM. ON THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE FARMING METHODS IN MODERN PROD. AGRIC., NAT'LREa&CH
COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 10(1989) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE].
40. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
41. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 394-03 (2d ed. 1994) for a discussion of how the
focus on pesticide safety promotes the unrestrained use of registered pesticides.
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sources of pollution.4 2 The major problem with pesticide use, however, is the
arms race dilemma. Insects have considerable capacity to adapt to pesticide uses
by developing higher tolerance levels. Thus, it takes continually more pesticides
to achieve the same kill ratio. Since the 1950s, alternative pest control
techniques, known as Integrated Pest Management, have existed, but their
application to major crops remains limited.43
In most cases, the incentives to engage in unsustainable agricultural practices
come from government subsidies. Subsidies are very difficult to eliminate,
because they develop powerful political constituencies. A good example of this
problem is the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996. 4 The Act was
intended to lessen the dependence of many farmers on a single crop tied to a
lucrative federal price-support program. To wean farmers from dependency on
federal checks, federal price supports for key crops were frozen at 1995 levels:
an aggregate of six billion dollars.45 In return, farmers were given "production
flexibility contracts" to replace the existing scheme of acreage allotments and
were guaranteed parity prices if the market price for their crops fell below the
Department of Agricultural parity price.4 6 Farmers were given greater discretion
about crop choice, and this could have led to more sustainable cropping patterns.
So far, the farm program has been a failure. Farm income fell so much
between 1996 and 1998 that Congress appropriated an additional thirty million
dollars for crop payments and restored many production controls.47 In addition,
the preservation of the status quo prevented many more rational cropping
choices. Farmers were prohibited from switching to many high-value vegetable
crops, because these crops do not receive price supports.48 Congress concluded
that allowing such switches would give farmers with flexibility contracts an
unfair competitive advantage over unsubsidized vegetable farmers. The cycle of
subsidy continues. The George W. Bush administration tried to shift the focus of
42. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT'L WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, 1996 REPORT TO CONG. ES-15(I
available at http://www.epa.gov/ow/resources/9698/chap6h.html (revised Jan. 19, 1999).
43. ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra note 39, at 175-89; See STEPHEN R. PALUMBI, THE EVOLUTION
EXPLOSION 131-61 (2001).
44. 7 U.S.C.A § 7201 (West 1999).
45. See Jeffrey A. Peterson, The 1996 Farm Bill: What to (Re)Do in 2002, 11 KAN. J.L. & PuaPCL'Y65,71
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46. See7 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West 1999).
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the 2001 Farm Bill, which was still pending in Congress as of mid-October 2001,
from the continued annual payment of some $5 billion directly to farmers to one
that created greater incentives for land conservation. However, the House
defeated the Administration's proposals in favor of the usual subsidy pattern. 49
V. CONCLUSION: EMBEDDING SD IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

The history of environmental law provides some valuable lessons on how SD
might be embedded into government institutions. In brief, the mistakes made in
the passage of NEPA should not be repeated. NEPA's architects made a crucial
decision to opt for a general policy of environmental protection that would apply
across the board to all government agencies rather than to amend major

government acts to provide greater incentives and duties for specific agencies to
engage in environmental protection. This decision doomed NEPA as a statute that
would never reach its potential. First, no definition of environmental quality was
provided. Second, procedure was exalted over substance. Third, environmental
protection remains locked in a negative rather than a positive mode.
Environmental regulation began as a guerilla movement to stop public and private
actors from doing what seemed like bad things, bulldozing a wetland, a pristine
forest, or discharging untreated wastes into a river. The movement never
developed a positive vision of an environmentally sustainable society, and thus the
emphasis remains on controlling undesirable behavior instead of inducing desirable
outcomes.5 °
SD and ESD can also benefit from the lessons learned from thirty-plus years
of federal environmental protection. The first step in the development of effective
SD and ESD is to develop indices of SD and ESD, as is just now occurring with
respect to environmental protection. 5 1 These indices will be shaped by the
concept's intellectual heritage.
Economists have long struggled to determine the most efficient way to exploit
non-renewable resources, such as oil and gas reservoirs, and potentially
renewable resources, such as stocks of fish. They have long realized that
efficiency requires a comparison between the present and future value of a non49. See Elizabeth Becker, House Rejects an Effort to Redirect Farm Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 5,2001, at A14.
50. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law" Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
237, 244-47 (2000).

51. See generally
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renewable resource, 52 and similar calculations must be made for resources that
can switch from renewable to non-renewable. The calculations are complex, but
the basic point is that limits must be imposed to conserve the resource for the
immediate as well as the long-range future. Thus, the idea that the consumption
of exhaustible and fragile resources must be limited is the first major principle of
SD.
The second idea-the assumption of ethical obligations to future
generations-follows from the first. Traditional economists have not been
terribly impressed with the need to assume such obligations, given the long
history of resource substitution and continued progress. 53 However, the work of
Edith Brown Weiss 54 and others has converted the duty to conserve resources for
future generations into the fundamental international environmental ethic. It is the
ethical basis for many nations such as the United States, which are well prepared
to adapt to projected global warming, and to participate in an international effort
to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. Enormous
problems remain in working out what the precise duties stemming from that ethic
are, but the core principle that we must restrain present consumption for the
benefit of future generations is a powerful idea that runs counter to the longstanding Western belief in progress.
The third idea is that SD requires implementation by both individuals and
governments. This is an important contribution of ESD to SD. Environmental
protection is moving slowly from the first to the second generation. The first
generation was characterized by top-down regulation of the "other" large private
and public sources of pollution. This strategy has been quite successful, but we
now realize that most of the major sources of pollution such as non-point water
pollution and ozone come from thousands of small sources. Behavior
modification must therefore be brought down from the corporate and
governmental to the individual level as well. More important, in an era of the
declining influence of governments, informed consumer choice is a powerful
leverage point to reinforce environmentally sustainable practices throughout the
world.
The second mistake to rectify is the exaltation of process over substance.
The decreasing effectiveness of NEPA, the foundation of modern environmental
52. See generally Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137 (1931).
53. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Running Out: The Problem of ExhaustibleResources, 7 J. LEGALSIiUD.
165 (1978).
54. WEISS, supra note 7.
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law, illustrates this. NEPA's goal was originally to infuse substantive
environmental considerations in all relevant federal programs and activities. But,
as defined by courts, the goal of the process is to produce an adequate
environmental impact statement divorced from the merits of the action. Any
change in agency behavior is indirect rather than direct. In contrast, the goal of
any process designed to implement SD and ESD is to change behavior. SD and
ESD require a careful congressional review of statutes and programs to determine
if they advance or hinder the achievement of SD and ESD indices. Once any
defects are itentified, agencies should be forced to develop a substantive
correction strategy. The NEPA requirement that the agency consider a
reasonable range of alternatives can be modified to achieve this result. Agencies
should be required to choose a limited number of alternatives, all of which move
in the direction of SD and ESD. Maintaining the status quo or adopting only
token modifications should not be an option. The relevant issues for the choice
of alternatives are the economic, environmental, and social costs of program
change, the available technologies and methodologies to implement effective
change, and the appropriate time horizon to make a fair transition from
unsustainable to sustainable resource exploitation and use practice. This strategy
will not guarantee the effective pursuit of SD and ESD, but it will make it easier
to focus on the critical issues that must be faced if governments are to make the
transition from unsustainability to sustainability.

